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Abstract
Speech-acts can have literal meaning as well as pragmatic
meaning, but these both involve consequences typically in-
tended by a speaker. Speech-acts can also have unintentional
meaning, in which what is conveyed goes above and beyond
what was intended. Here, we present a Bayesian analysis of
how, to a listener, the meaning of an utterance can significantly
differ from a speaker’s intended meaning. Our model em-
phasizes how comprehending the intentional and unintentional
meaning of speech-acts requires listeners to engage in sophisti-
cated model-based perspective-taking and reasoning about the
history of the state of the world, each other’s actions, and each
other’s observations. To test our model, we have human partic-
ipants make judgments about vignettes where speakers make
utterances that could be interpreted as intentional insults or un-
intentional faux pas. In elucidating the mechanics of speech-
acts with unintentional meanings, our account provides insight
into how communication both functions and malfunctions.
Keywords: Bayesian modeling, social cognition, common
ground, speech-act theory, faux pas, theory of mind
Introduction
People sometimes communicate things that they did not in-
tend or expect. Consider the following vignette, adapted
from Baron-Cohen et al. (1999):
Curtains Paul had just moved into a new apartment.
Paul went shopping and bought some new curtains for
his bedroom. After he returned from shopping and had
put up the new curtains in the bedroom, his best friend,
Lisa, came over. Paul gave her a tour of the apartment
and asked, “How do you like my bedroom?”
“Those curtains are horrible,” Lisa said. “I hope you’re
going to get some new ones!”
Clearly, Lisa committed a social blunder or faux pas with
her remark. What happened here? When Lisa says, “Those
curtains look horrible,” she is merely stating her private aes-
thetic experience of the curtains. The literal meaning is
straightforward: The curtains look bad. And the intended or
expected meaning of her utterance is largely captured by this
literal meaning. However, to Paul, the utterance means more.
Specifically, what Lisa is really saying is that he chose horri-
ble curtains. Of course, Lisa did not “really” say that Paul’s
*The author’s affiliation with The MITRE Corporation is provided for identification
purposes only, and is not intended to convey or imply MITRE’s concurrence with, or
support for, the positions, opinions, or viewpoints expressed by the author.
choice in curtains was horrible—she had no intention of con-
veying such an idea. Paul might even realize this. Nonethe-
less, the remark stings. Why? Lisa and Paul each possess a
piece of a puzzle, and when put together, they entail that Paul
has awful taste in curtains. At the outset, neither one knew
that they each had a piece of a puzzle. But once Lisa makes
her remark, she inadvertently completes the puzzle, at least
from Paul’s perspective.
Standard models of communication (Grice, 1957; Sperber
& Wilson, 1986) tend to focus on how people use language
successfully. For example, people can imply more than they
literally mean (Carston, 2002), convey subtle distinctions via
metaphor (Tendahl & Gibbs Jr, 2008), and manage their own
and others’ public face using politeness (Levinson, Brown,
Levinson, & Levinson, 1987; Yoon, Frank, Tessler, & Good-
man, 2018). But things do not always go smoothly, as Paul
and Lisa’s situation indicates. Sometimes people find them-
selves having inadvertently stepped on conversational land-
mines, meaning things that they never anticipated meaning.
Notably, because such situations present complex dilemmas
of mutual perspective-taking against a backdrop of divergent
knowledge, they can serve as advanced tests of theory of
mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Zalla, Sav, Stopin, Ahade,
& Leboyer, 2009; Korman, Zalla, & Malle, 2017). But how
do people reason about such dilemmas? And how can this
be understood computationally? Disentangling unintentional
meaning can shed light on how communication works in a
broader social context as well as inform the design of artifi-
cial intelligences that interact with people.
Here, we develop a rational, cognitive account of interpret-
ing unintentional speech-acts that builds on existing Bayesian
models of language (e.g., Rational Speech Act [RSA] mod-
els [Goodman & Frank, 2016]). To do this, we analyze the
general epistemic structure of social interactions such as the
one described above and model listeners engaging in model-
based perspective-taking. In particular, our model explains
how the same utterance could be interpreted as either an (un-
intentional) faux pas or an intentional insult depending on
the context of a listener and speaker’s interaction. We then
test several model predictions in an experiment with human
participants. In the following sections, we outline our compu-
tational model, experimental results, and their implications.
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A Bayesian Account of Unintentional Meaning
During social interactions, people reason about the world as
well as each other’s perspective on the world (Brown-Schmidt
& Heller, 2018). Thus, our account has two components,
which we formulate as probabilistic models. First, we spec-
ify a world model that captures common-sense relationships
between world states, actions, and events. Second, we define
agent models of a speaker and listener reasoning about the
world and one another.
World Model
We model the interaction as a partially observable stochas-
tic game (POSG), a generalization of Markov Decision Pro-
cesses (MDPs) with multiple agents with private obser-
vations (Kuhn, 1953). Formally, a world model W “
xI ,S ,A ,Z,T y where:
• I is a set of n agents indexed 1, ...,n;
• S is a set of possible states of the world, where each state
s P S is an assignment to k variables, s“ px0,x1, ...,xkq;
• A “ŚiPI A i is the set of joint actions, i.e., every combi-
nation of each agent i’s actions, A i (including utterances);
• Z “ŚiPI Zi is the set of joint private observations, which
is every possible combination of each individual agent i’s
private observation set, Zi; and
• T “ Ppz,s1 | s,aq is a transition function representing the
probability of a joint observation z and next state s1 given a
previous state s P S and joint action a P A was taken.
In Curtains, the initial state, s0, includes Paul with the old
curtains in the apartment and Lisa elsewhere. There is also
a latent state feature of interest: whether Paul has good or
bad taste. At t “ 0, Paul’s action, aPaul0 , is choosing new cur-
tains, while Lisa’s action, aLisa0 , is going to the apartment.
The joint action, a0 “ paPaul0 ,aLisa0 q, results in a new state, s1,
with them both in the apartment, the curtains either good or
bad, and Paul’s taste. Paul’s observation, zPaul0 , but not Lisa’s,
zLisa0 , includes Paul having put up the curtains. These rela-
tionships between world states (e.g. Paul and Lisa’s loca-
tions), actions (e.g. Lisa walking to Paul’s apartment), and
observations (e.g. Paul observing himself put up the cur-
tains) are formally encoded in the transition function T . The
sequence of states, joint actions and observations resulting
from such interactions constitute the history up to a point t,
~ht “ ps0,a0,z0, ...,st´1,at´1,zt´1,stq.
Agent Models
Agents are modeled as Bayesian decision-makers (Bernardo
& Smith, 1994) who can reason about the world and other
agents as well as take actions—including making utterances.
Interactive Belief State Agents’ beliefs are probability dis-
tributions over variables that represent aspects of the current
state, previous states, or each other’s beliefs. The configu-
ration of these first- and higher-order, recursive beliefs con-
stitute their interactive belief state (Gmytrasiewicz & Doshi,
2005). We refer to an agent i’s beliefs as bi. For example,
if we denote Paul’s taste as the variable T Paul, then Paul’s
belief that his taste is good is bPaulpT Paul “ Goodq. Higher-
order beliefs can also be represented. For instance, we can
calculate Paul’s expectation of Lisa’s belief in his taste as
EbPaulrbLisaspT Paulq “
ř
bLisa b
PaulpbLisapT Paulqq.
An agent i’s beliefs are a function of their prior, model of
the world, model of other agents, and observation history up
to time t, ~z it . Note that ~z
i
t can include observations that are
completely private to i (e.g., Lisa’s personal aesthetic expe-
rience) as well as public actions and utterances (e.g., Lisa’s
remark to Paul). Thus, we denote Paul’s belief about his taste
at a time t as bPault pT Paulq “ bPaulpT Paul |~zPault q. Given a se-
quence of observations,~z it , posterior beliefs about a variable
X are updated via Bayes’ rule:
bpX |~z it q 9 bp~z it |XqbpXq (1)
“
ÿ
~ht
bp~z it |~htqbp~ht ,Xq (2)
The capacity to reason about higher-order beliefs (e.g.,
Paul’s beliefs about Lisa’s belief in his taste), along with
Equation 2 express agents’ joint inferences about events and
model-based perspective-taking.
Speaker Model Speakers have beliefs and goals. When
choosing what to say, they may have beliefs and goals with re-
spect to the listener’s beliefs and goals. In our example, Lisa
may care about being informative about how she sees the cur-
tains, but may also think Paul cares about having good taste
in curtains and care whether she hurts his feelings. Follow-
ing previous work (e.g., Franke, 2009), we model speakers
as reasoning about changes in belief states. Here, we are in-
terested in how a speaker can intend to mean one thing but
inadvertently mean another. Thus, we distinguish between
state variables that the speaker wants to be informative about,
X Info (e.g., how Lisa sees the curtains), and evaluative vari-
ables, XEval, that the listener wants to take on a specific value
xEval˚ (e.g., Paul’s taste being good). The speaker then cares
about the changes in those quantities. Formally:
∆L-Infot “ bLt`1pX Info “ xInfoq´bLt pX Info “ xInfoq, (3)
where xInfo is given by~ht ; and,
∆L-Evalt “ bLt`1pXEval “ xEval˚q´bLt pXEval “ xEval˚q. (4)
A speaker who is interested in what the listener thinks
about X Info and XEval will, at a minimum, anticipate how their
utterances will influence ∆L-Infot and ∆L-Evalt . A speaker would
then have a reward function defined as:
RSpaSt ,~zLt`1q “ θL-Info∆L-Infot `θL-Eval∆L-Evalt (5)
where the θ terms correspond to how the speaker values cer-
tain outcomes in the listener’s mental state. For instance, if
θL-Eval ă 0, the speaker wants to insult the speaker.
Given Equation 5, a speaker can take utterances based on
expected future utility/rewards (or value [Sutton & Barto,
...
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(b)
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horrible!
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Those look
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Sequence
Lisa believes that 
Paul did not choose 
the curtains and 
that he has good taste.
Paul actually chose the curtains
and does not have good taste.
Lisa does not like the curtains.
Paul initially believes that 
Lisa liked the curtains and 
that he has good taste.
Lisa’s remark leads Paul 
to realize that 
Lisa did not like the
curtains, and that
he does not have good taste.
Figure 1: Model and example of unintentional meaning. (a) Influence diagram with state, action, and observation dependencies.
Circles correspond to world state (e.g., st ) and observation (e.g., zit ) variables; squares correspond to agent action variables
(including utterances) (e.g., ait ). (b) Event sequence in Curtains (top) and speaker observation history (bottom). Lisa does
not observe Paul choose the curtains. Only Lisa experiences whether the curtains look good or bad and comments on this
experience. (c) Diagram of interactive belief state over time in Curtains.
1998]), where the expectation is taken with respect to the
speaker’s beliefs, bSt . That is, given observations~z
S
t , the value
of aSt is V
SpaSt ;~zSt q “ EbSt
“
RSpaSt ,~zLt`1q
‰
, and an action is cho-
sen using a Luce choice rule (Luce, 1959).
Listener Inference Our goal is to characterize how a
listener’s interpretation of an utterance can differ from a
speaker’s intended meaning, which requires specifying lis-
tener inferences. We start with a simple listener that under-
stands the literal meanings of words when spoken. Following
previous models (Franke, 2009; Goodman & Frank, 2016),
the literal meaning of an utterance aS is determined by its
truth-functional denotation, which maps histories to Boolean
truth values, rraSss :~ht ÞÑ y, y P tTrue,Falseu. A literal lis-
tener’s model of speaker utterances is:
bpaS |~htq 9
#
1´ ε if rraSssp~htq
ε if  rraSssp~htq
where ε is a small probability of aS being said even if it hap-
pens to be false.
We can also posit a more sophisticated listener who, rather
than assuming utterances literally reflect reality, reason about
how a speaker’s beliefs and goals mediate their use of lan-
guage. This type of listener draws inferences based on an
intentional model of a speaker that track the quantities in
Equations 3 and 4 as well as maximize the expected rewards.
These inferences, however, occur while the listener is also
reasoning about the actual sequence of events ~ht , making
it possible to draw inferences based on utterances that the
speaker did not anticipate.
Model Simulations
In the original Curtains scenario, Lisa was not present when
Paul put up the curtains. As a result, Lisa’s comment (“Those
curtains are horrible”) is interpreted in a diverging observa-
tion history context. But what if Lisa had been present when
Paul put up the curtains and made the same utterance? Given
a shared observation history, Lisa’s utterance is still offen-
sive, but now Lisa has all the information needed to realize it
would be offensive. Put simply, in the diverging history con-
(a)
(b)
(c)
Model Predictions
Participant Results
Participant Results (passed manipulation check)
Speaker expected
listener to feel
bad about ability
Listener thinks
speaker expected
listener to feel
bad about ability
Diverging History
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** *********
****** ************
Figure 2: (a) Model predictions. The model predicts that the listener’s change in belief in the evaluative variable (∆L-Evalt ) is
equally negative in the diverging and shared history scenarios. However, whether the speaker anticipated the offensiveness of
their comment differs between the two scenarios, as do the listener’s beliefs about the speaker’s anticipation. (b) Judgments
from all participants by question. Responses were normalized depending on whether response scales were valanced (Q1),
likelihood (Q2-Q7), or qualitative (Q8). (c) Judgments from participants who correctly identified whether the speaker knew the
listener modified the object. ˚ : pă .05, ˚˚ : pă .01, ˚˚˚ : pă .001.
text, the utterance is a faux pas, whereas in the shared history
context, it is an intentional insult.
In this section, we discuss how our model can be used to
make these intuitive predictions precise and explain how they
arise from agents’ interactions and model-based perspective-
taking within a shared environment. We implemented our
model in WebPPL (Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller, 2014), a pro-
gramming language that can express stochastic processes like
POSGs as well as Bayesian inference.
Generative Model
To model a scenario like Curtains, we define agents, objects,
and features assigned to them. These are the curtains, which
have a location (inside Paul’s apartment); the speaker (Lisa),
who has a location (inside or outside Paul’s apartment) and
a perception of the curtains (good or bad); and the listener
(Paul), who has a location (inside or outside) and ability to
choose curtains (high or low). Additionally, the listener can
either act on the curtains or not, while the speaker can enter
the apartment and make an utterance about the curtains (“the
curtains look good”, “the curtains look bad”, or <nothing>).
The truth-conditional semantics of the utterances map onto
world features in a standard manner, and we set ε“ .05.
Observations depend on whether agents and objects are co-
located and are defined as subsets of state and action vari-
ables. For instance, if Paul and Lisa are both inside the house
and Paul modifies the curtains, they both observe that Paul
acted on the curtains, but only Lisa directly knows whether
they look good to her. Finally, we define a state and action
prior for both agents such that the listener’s ability is initially
high (p“ 0.90), the speaker’s perception of the object is ini-
tially random (p“ 0.50), and the listener has a low probabil-
ity of modifying the object (p“ 0.05).
Model Predictions
Given the generative model, we can provide scenarios and
calculate aspects of the resulting interactive belief state (the
listener and speaker’s beliefs about the world and each other’s
beliefs). In particular, we compare the results of a shared
history with those of a diverging history. In the shared his-
tory, the speaker and listener are both present when the lis-
tener modifies the object, whereas in the diverging history,
the speaker is not present when the listener acts on the object.
Otherwise, the two scenarios are the same and the speaker
comments on the curtains being bad. Figure 2a displays the
results of the simulation when given each of the two histories.
In both histories, the listener learns that their ability when
modifying the object, XEval, is low (i.e., ∆L-Evalt ă 0). They
also learn about the informative variable (i.e., ∆L-Infot ą 0).
However, the resulting interactive belief states differ in im-
portant ways. For example, in the diverging history, although
the listener concludes that the evaluative variable is low, the
speaker thinks the evaluative variable is high. Relatedly, the
speaker thinks the utterance was informative (EbS r∆L-Infos ą
0) but not offensive (EbS r∆L-Evals “ 0). Moreover, the listener
knows the speaker believes that their comment was expected
to be informative and not offensive. In the shared history,
this is not the case: The listener and speaker both believe the
evaluative variable is low, and they both know the resulting
informational and evaluative effects. Because they were both
present when the listener modified the object, they share ex-
pectations about the utterance’s meaning.
Put intuitively, whereas the shared history leads to an ex-
pected insult, the diverging history leads to a faux pas. Our
model explains this difference in terms of differential trans-
formations of the listener and speaker’s interactive belief
state.
Experiment
Our model explains how different observation histories re-
sult in interactive belief states, which can produce uninten-
tional meaning. To test whether this accurately describes
people’s capacity to reason about unintentional meaning, we
had people read vignettes that described scenarios involv-
ing shared or diverging observation histories. The under-
lying logical structure of all the vignettes mirrored that of
Curtains, and so the model predictions described in the
previous section apply to all of them. Participants then
provided judgments corresponding to predicted differences
in listener/speaker beliefs. The study’s main hypotheses
were preregistered on the Open Science Framework platform
(https://osf.io/84wqn). Overall, we find that our model
captures key qualitative features of people’s inferences.
Materials
We developed a set of vignettes that included interactions in
different contexts as well as different histories of interaction.
Each vignette involved a listener (e.g., Paul) who could po-
tentially interact with an object (e.g., curtains) as well as a
speaker (e.g., Lisa) who makes an utterance about their neg-
ative aesthetic experience of the object (e.g., “The curtains
look horrible”). In the shared history versions of the vi-
gnettes, the two agents were described as being both present
when the listener acted on an object. In the diverging history
versions of the vignettes, the speaker was not present when
the listener interacted with the object. Each vignette involved
one of five contexts: Curtain, Story-Prize, Wine-bottle, Cup-
cakes, and Parking. Thus there were a total of ten items (Di-
verging/Shared history ˆ 5 contexts). All items used in the
experiment are available on the primary author’s website.
Procedure
One-hundred participants were recruited via MTurk to partic-
ipate in our experiment using PsiTurk (Gureckis et al., 2016).
Each participant read one of the ten context-history items, and
then answered the following questions in order:
• Q1: At this point, how does <listener> feel about their
ability to <action>? [6 point scale ranging “Very Bad” to
“Very Good” with no neutral option]
• Q2: <listener> thinks that <speaker> expected that
their remark would make them feel <Q1 response>.
• Q3: <listener> thinks that in making the remark,
<speaker> wanted to make them feel <Q1 response>.
• Q4: <listener> thinks that <speaker> thinks that
<listener> <action>.
• Q5: <speaker> knew that <listener> <action>.
• Q6: In making the remark, <speaker> expected
<listener> to feel <Q1 response>.
• Q7: In making the remark, <speaker> wanted
<listener> to feel <Q1 response>.
• Q8: How awkward is this situation? [5 point scale ranging
“Not at all” to “Extremely”
The values for <listener>, <speaker>, and <action>were
specified parametrically based on the context, while the value
for <Q1 response> was filled in based on the answer to the
first question. The response scale for questions 2-7 was a
six-point scale ranging from “Definitely Not” to “Definitely”,
with no neutral point. We included question 8 because pre-
vious work studying faux pas have focused on this ques-
tion (Zalla et al., 2009). Participants were also given free
response boxes to elaborate on their interpretation of the sit-
uation and answered demographic questions.
Question β S.E. df t p
Q1 -0.06 0.07 94.0 -0.77
Q2 0.15 0.06 94.0 2.65 **
Q3 0.15 0.06 94.0 2.50 *
Q4 0.18 0.06 94.0 2.78 **
Q5 0.25 0.06 94.0 4.34 ***
Q6 0.14 0.06 94.0 2.53 *
Q7 0.15 0.06 94.0 2.64 **
Q8 0.04 0.05 94.0 0.78
Table 1: Tests for Diverging/Shared history factor.
Experimental Results
Manipulation check To assess whether the Diverg-
ing/Shared history manipulation worked, we examined re-
sponses to Q5 (whether the speaker knew the listener acted on
the object). A comparison in which the responses were coded
Figure 3: Judgment correlations (Pearson’s r).
as Yes or No (i.e., above or below the middle of the response
scale) showed that it was effective (χ2p1q “ 7.92, p ă .01).
However, a number of participants (15 of 50 in Shared; 20
of 50 in Diverging) did not pass this manipulation check and
gave opposite answers than implied by the stories. Whether
their responses are included does not affect our qualitative re-
sults, and in our analyses we use the full data set. Figure 2c
plots the results for those who passed this check.
Judgment differences Responses paralleled the model pre-
dictions for the Shared versus Diverging history versions of
the vignettes (Figure 2b). For each judgment, we fit mixed-
effects linear models with context intercepts as a random ef-
fect and history as a fixed effect. Table shows tests of sig-
nificance on the Diverging/Shared history parameters. Judg-
ments about the listener’s feelings (Q1) were negative and not
significantly different, indicating that people perceived the
psychological impact (at least with respect to ability) of the
utterance as roughly equivalent. In contrast, questions about
the interactive belief state—the listener and speaker’s beliefs
about the world and each other’s beliefs (Q2-Q7)—differed
as predicted by the model. In particular, participants thought
that the speaker neither expected that their utterance would
hurt the listener’s feelings, nor that they wanted to do so. Par-
ticipants judged that the listener recognized this as well.
Judgment correlations Judgments among questions about
higher order mental states were strongly correlated, while
those between the higher order mental states and the lis-
tener’s action were weaker (Figure 3). Specifically, those
about speaker mental states (Q6, Q7) and listener beliefs
about speaker mental states (Q2, Q3) were all highly corre-
lated (all r P r0.77,0.91s, p ă .001). In contrast, questions
about knowledge of the object being modified (Q4, Q5) were
only moderately correlated with those about anticipated ef-
fects (Q2, Q3, Q6, Q7) (all r P r0.48,0.64s, pă .001).
Discussion
People’s actions can have unexpected consequences, and
speech-acts are no different. To understand unintentional
meaning though, we need to characterize how a communica-
tive act can lead to unanticipated epistemic consequences.
Sometimes, a listener can learn something from an utter-
ance that a speaker did not intend to convey or may not even
believe (e.g., as in Curtains). Here, we have presented a
Bayesian model and experiments testing how people reason
about scenarios involving unintentional speech acts. Specif-
ically, our account treats speech-acts as actions taken by a
speaker that influence a shared interactive belief state—the
beliefs each agent has about the world and each other’s be-
liefs. In doing so, we can capture the inferences that underlie
unintentional meaning.
The current work raises important empirical and theoreti-
cal questions about how people reason about interactive be-
liefs and unintentional meaning. For instance, our experi-
ments focus on third-party judgments about how a listener
interprets the unintended meanings of utterances, but further
work would be needed to assess how listeners do this (e.g.,
when the victim of an offhand comment) or even how speak-
ers can recognize this (e.g., realizing one has put their foot in
their mouth). Additionally, we have presented a Bayesian ac-
count of unintentional meaning in which agents reason about
a large but finite set of possible histories of interaction. In
everyday conversation, the space of possible histories can be
much larger or even infinite. It is thus an open question how
people can approximate the recursive inferences needed to
make sense of unintentional meaning.
A rigorous characterization of unintentional meaning can
deepen our understanding of how communication works in
a broader social context. For example, attempts to build
common ground through shared experience (Clark & Mar-
shall, 1981; McKinley, Brown-Schmidt, & Benjamin, 2017)
or manage face with polite speech (Levinson et al., 1987;
Yoon et al., 2018) could be understood, in part, as strate-
gies for forestalling unintentional meaning. And given that
intentionality plays a key role in judgments of blame (Baird
& Astington, 2004), phenomena like plausible deniability
could be understood as people leveraging the possibility of
unintentional meaning to covertly accomplish communicative
goals (Pinker, Nowak, & Lee, 2008). Although further inves-
tigation is needed to test the extent to which people can track
and influence interactive belief states (as well as how artifi-
cial agents can do so), this work provides a point of departure
for computationally investigating these social and cognitive
aspects of communication.
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